[ntp:hackers] Protocol specification modification for MS-SNTP
tglassey at earthlink.net
Fri Jul 10 02:12:26 UTC 2009
Harlan Stenn wrote:
> I just wanted to mention that from my POV this discusison seems to point
> out that:
> - ntp needs to be robust and support a bunch of things.
> - different people will want to disable/enable various non-default
> 'configure' choices to meet their local policy needs.
> Assuming the above is true, it means:
> - we need to be sure that NTP *can* handle the needs of as much of its
> userbase as possible
> - we must strive to make implementing these non-default 'configure'
> choices as clear and painless as possible
> and what we are discussing are the pros/cons (or costs/benefits) of the
> various default choices we offer in 'configure' (and sometimes the
> ntp.conf file).
Harlan - use models for NTP and SNTP are really up to the auditors and
to the scientists who are running research projects. And you are 100%
right about that the uses will be different.
Another thing that NTP is going to want to be able to certify the
time-stamp inline. This means the addition of a set of payload
certifying token definitions for one of the two optional payload areas.
We talked about this years ago and the group wasnt interested. Since we
are talking about changes to the protocol to make it more robust I want
to again provide the input that creating an evidence transport is the
real win. The intent is to allow for evidence of the policy of the
time-stamp to be integrated into the protocol so that the event evidence
*(the timestamp) can also carry policy controls inside the stamp itself.
This is NOT something necessary for technical time synchronization uses,
but is a key to relying on NTP for other applications like commercial
records and the like.
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