[ntp:questions] Re: Cryptography

Paul Repacholi prep at prep.synonet.com
Sat Dec 13 14:17:24 UTC 2003


Dale Worley <worley at dragon.ariadne.com> writes:

> What I'm proposing (and do not know how to implement) is a system
> where it does not matter if the intermediate system is a good guy or
> not.  This property is not self-contradictory -- for instance, if
> you receive PGP-signed e-mail, you do not need to know if the
> intermediate relays that delivered the e-mail to you are
> trustworthy.

But in this case, the untrusted system soes not have to `unwrap'
the message, in fact, can not. Your untrusted server *must*
look inside the packet, and send you a new packet. All you can
get is that it has the key of A, not that it has used it in any
usefull fashion.

-- 
Paul Repacholi                               1 Crescent Rd.,
+61 (08) 9257-1001                           Kalamunda.
                                             West Australia 6076
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Raw, Cooked or Well-done, it's all half baked.
EPIC, The Architecture of the future, always has been, always will be.



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