[ntp:questions] Gretchen - in regard to CertifiedTime it never died...
mayer at ntp.org
Sun May 3 03:11:41 UTC 2009
Todd Glassey CISM CIFI wrote:
> Danny Mayer wrote:
>> Todd Glassey CISM CIFI wrote:
>>> Gretchen Baxter wrote:
>>>> in that case, this is good news for everyone in the timing community.
>>> We think so - and as CertifiedTime's original founder I am overjoyed
>>> to turn CertifiedTime's services back online. The intent when I built
>>> CertifiedTime Inc originally was to build a uniform time source which
>>> is operated inside of an Audit Practice which meets BOTH the RFC3161
>>> requirements (set by ETSI and the EU) for running time service
>>> enterprises as well as those through US Law as well. We at Certichron
>>> are doing exactly that.
>>> This, by the way, is why I keep asserting that the following is
>>> necessary because of the sheer number of implementations using any
>>> number of OS interfaces including those run-time services added here
>>> by the ISC.ORG NTP effort. The same is needed for each commercial
>>> release of NTP including all commercial providers since the Audit
>>> Community has been formally put on notice this key set of definitions
>>> and goal's don't exist, and since they cannot review those test
>>> reports they can no longer allow the introduction of un-certified
>>> code into production systems.
>> I am not aware of any commercial providers of NTP apart from the two
>> mentioned above. The O/S vendors include NTP in their O/S's but they do
>> not provide commercial NTP.
> You mean an outsourced NTP services.
No I don't. I meant exactly what I wrote.
>> the above mentioned companies seem to
>> provide commercial services of NTP. Who provided the formal notice to
>> the Audit Community and what reasons were given? What test reports
>> exist? There is an implication here that uncertified code was allowed
>> onto production systems but the reality here is that most of the O/S is
>> not certified either.
> That is exactly what I said Danny.
I don't see anywhere where you said the O/S's were not certified. Nor do
I see where it's related to anything you are claiming. You still have
not stated who provided a formal notice nor what the subject of that
formal notice was or any other details.
>> Just a formal comment here. The NTP Public Services project which makes
>> available the NTP reference implementation does NOT provide any formal
>> verification that the source code that it distributes is valid or
>> correct nor does it validate any of the time sources beyond what
>> protocols like autokey provides.
> That means that people that need to rely on a known functional code-base
> with proper security auditing cannot use the NTP.ORG sw itself but must
> rather rely on the test processes of the vendor's to supply a competent
> implementation. The problem we face is more and more of them are laying
> the responsibility to test NTP on the NTP.ORG entity, which doesnt
> provide that service, meaning that the OS Vendor's themselves are making
> their copies also unusable under the existing requirement's for
> trust-service tools to be fully tested and their releases managed.
I am not aware of any vendor providing test processes. If there are any
please provide details and pointers. If a vendor wants the NTP Public
Services project to provide testing services we'd be glad to do so for a
fee. Note that the software sources are managed.
>> Autokey merely validates that the
>> sender of the NTP packet is coming from where it says it comes from and
>> that itself is based on out-of-band keys provided by the provider of
>> that source.
> True - its only a end-point identity tool. That and the liabilities of
> running UDP over the open Internet speak for itself.
That it uses UDP is irrelevant here.
>> In no case does it guarantee that the time source is
>> providing valid time. Furthermore RFC3161 is not supported or
>> implemented by the reference implementation of NTP.
> Amen to that - which is why there are NO European TS providers today -
> the tools don't exist for them.
No, it has nothing to do with NTP. RFC3161 is a protocol for providing a
timestamping service for a specific purpose. It has nothing to do with
disciplining your system clock.
>> Third party providers may provide any or all such features. However it
>> is important that you ensure that those providers meet any contractual
>> requirements that you may have and the NTP timesources meet the
>> standards required of the country where you are providing such services.
> Actually the time services need to be appropriate for the jurisdictions
> those events would be prosecuted in. They may also need to be
> enforceable in other jurisdictions as well meaning a composite
> time-scale between those time-bases used in the process would be
> necessary, especially if a legal metrological agreement exists between
> those jurisdictions.
It's hard to understand how a you could have a legal metrological
agreement that requires an accurate timestamp.
>> You would need to contact the country's national time standards body for
>> information about that and what services that they provide.
>>> 1) A formal specification of how NTP works with what Kernel
>>> resources and what the thread overhead of those controls inside the
>>> Run-Time Image ace. The intent is to create a set of metrics which
>>> can be used by NTP implementors to tune their releases and to set a
>>> 'stake in the ground' for implementors of appliance style NTP systems.
>>> 2) A formal specification for testing NTP and a method of
>>> specify partial or core compliance since many of the new controls
>>> added don't really make sense to keep inside all versions of NTP.
>>> (Sorry it is what it is - NTP - IMHO - should not be used for
>>> negotiating policy information - only for moving time around).
>> This is a very opaque statement and in is not clear what controls or
>> policy it is referring to.
> No its not. Its a statement that many of the security additions to NTP
> are based in implementing control policy as to who can and cannot update
> or get time. These are policy controls.
There have been no new controls in at least 8 years so I don't know what
you mean by recent nor is it clear what you are claiming here. None of
these are security changes.
>> Policy is not negotiated anywhere within the
>> reference implementation of NTP.
> Uh gee - the IP control features and the AutoKEY additions are exactly
> this policy stuff I am referring to.
>> It may be by third-party providers.
>>> 3) A formal characterization and operations guidelines so the
>>> commercial industry don't get bad advice on the systems and processes
>>> needed to generate that court-admissible evidence.
>> I have yet to see any requirements for court-admissible evidence by any
>> party including the courts.
> Which speaks for itself - thanks for documenting my claims regarding
> needing a proper time-management practice which is industry approved so
I have not documented any of your claims. Those are merely assertions on
your part. It's not even clear what industry you are claiming needs to
approve time-management practices.
>>> Todd Glassey
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